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GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN
THE MARKETS FOR EDUCATION AND
HEALTH CARE: HOW AND WHY?
ABSTRACT
Education and health care are the two largest government expenditure items in the United
States. The public sector directly provides the majority of educational services, through the
publicschool bureaucracy, while most public support for health care is channelled through a
system of tax-supported government payments for services provided by private providers. The
contrast between public policies in these markets raises a host of questions about the scope of
government in a mixed economy, and the structure of policies for market intervention. This
paper examines how two st4ndard arguments for government intervention in private markets,
market failure and redistribution, apply to the markets for education and medical care. It then
considers the "choice of instrument' problem, the choice between intervention via price subsidies,
mandates, and direct public provision of services in these markets. Economic arguments alone
seem unable to explain the sharp divergence between the nature of public policies with respect
to education and medical care. Moreover, there is virtually no evidence on the empirical
magnitudes of many of the key parameters needed to guide policy in these areas, such as the
social externalities associated with primary and secondary education or the degree to which






and NBEREducation and health care are the two largest government expenditure items in
most developed economies. In 1991, total government spending on primary and
secondary education in the United States totalled $219 billion, and another $96 billion
was spent on public colleges and universities. Education outlays represent nearly
thirty percent of government purchases of goods and services. Direct government
health care spending totalled $316 billion, and another $60 billion of foregone revenue
was attributable to deductions and exemptions of health-related items under the
income tax.
There are fundamental differences in the government's role in the health arid
education sectors of the United States economy. State and local governments are the
direct providers of the majority (92%) of primary and secondary educational services.
The service providers are government employees, with salaries set through a partly
potical process, and decisions about methods of production such as classroom
activities and curriculum are made by a quasi-political government bureaucracies.
Competition between alternative providers of educational services occurs largely
tl'.rough competition between communities for potential residents.
In health care, although federal, state, and local governments ultimately pay for
more than forty percent of health outlays, they are direct providers of relatively Little
health care. While state and local governments operate some hospitals, and the
federal government administers the VA medical network, most health care providers
work in the private sector. Various government programs and policies nevertheless
substantially reduce the cost of medical care for many consumers. Medicare and
Medicaid, the federal government's programs to provide health care services to the2
elderly and the indigent, are essentially tax-supported systems of government
payments for services provided in the private market. In addition, the current income
tax code subsidizes medical outlays by households who are neither elderly nor poor,
thereby altering the price of health services.
The contrast between public policies in these two markets raises a host of
qu'estions about the scope of government in a mixed economy. Even a cursory review
of current policies yields paradoxes. For example, why is most child care for pre-
schoolers in the United States provided through a system of family and private market
transactions, while primary and secondary education is provided directly by the
government? Why is the public sector's role in higher education substantially smaller
than its role in elementary education? Why did the GI Bill, which provided health care
and educational benefits for veterans of World War II, rely on a federal bureaucracy
(the VA) to directly provide health care, while relying on a variant of a voucher system
and private providers with respect to education? Why does the federal government
directly produce health care services for veterans, while relying on private providers
for those who receive benefits under Medicare and Medicaid? Why are there
substantial differences across localities in the degree of public vs. private provision of
some services?
These questions relate broadly to the "choice of instrument problem," the
question of how government should intervene in a market if such intervention is
deemed necessary. Although public finance textbooks, such as Rosen 1992) and
Stiglitz (1 988), begin by explaining that market failure and redisiributive3
considerations can justify government intervention in a market economy, there is
remarkably little discussion of what types of policies are justified. Empirical evidence
on the importance of potential market failures, and the distributional consequences of
various interventions in the markets for education and health care services, is
particularly scarce. Moreover, economic factors alone are unlikely to explain the
observed structure of public policy, which is duo in significant part to historical and
political influences.
This paper explores the "choice of instrument" problem with particular
application to the markets for education and health care. It is divided into five
sections. The first outlines the traditional market failure arguments that neoclassical
economists marshall to support of public intervention in private markets, and
discusses the application of these arguments to education and health care. Section
two explores the link between goals of redistributive justice and public policies in
these areas. Both education and health care have been described as "basic rights" in
some contexts, suggesting that these services should not be allocated on the basis
of ability to pay.
The third section examines the comparative merits of three potential policy
interventions: price subsidies, including the special case of full public payment for
purchases in the private market, public mandates for private provision, and direct
government provision. It highlights conditions under which each of these potential
instruments will be successful in achieving particular policy objectives, as well as
situations in which each instrument may fail. Section four describes the current4
structure and historical evolution of public policies toward education and health care
in the United States, and considers the degree to which the market failure and
redistributive considerations described in the earlier sections can account for these
policies. The concluding section outlines areas of uncertainty where further work is
needed to evaluate alternative policy instruments.
1. Market Failures in the Markets for Education and Health Care
Market imperfections may take many forms: the consumption of some goods
may impose external benefits or costs that are not reflected in their market prices,
informational asymmetries or other factors may lead to the non-existence of markets
for some products, or consumers may not have the information necessary to make
appropriate choices. This section considers the sources of market failure in markets
for education and health care.
1.1 Market Failures with Resoect to Education
Many of the classical economists broke with their usual laissez faire view of the
appropriate role of government when confronted with questions of education policy.
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith argued that "The state derivesno
inconsiderable advantage from [the education of the common people. If instructed
they arej ... less liable to the delusions of enthusiasm and superstition, whichamong
ignorant nations, frequently occasion the most dreadful disorders." (Book V. Part III,
article 2) This reference to society-wide externalities associated with the education5
of each individual is only one of the potential market imperfections that might warrant
government intervention in the market for schooling.
The first, and most commonly alledged, source of market failure with respect
to education is the presence of externalities from schooling. This argument has been
made in many ways; Cohn and Geske (1990) provide an overview. Some claim that
an educated electorate is vital to a successful democratic society, for example
because it permits individuals to keep records, file tax returns, and evaluate canipaign
material. Others argue that an educated workforce is critical for the adoption of new
technologies and for improving not just an individual's productivity, but that of his or
her co-workers. Yet a third externality argument holds that there is a negative
relationship between education and crime, so that widespread education will reduce
crime and the associated social disruption.
A related externality argument, that applied with particular force to the
nineteenth century United States, is that education assists in socializing many diverse
immigrant groups. This argument is probably specific to public education: providing
the same level of education, though various parochial schools, might have had a
smaller effect on social integration. Widespread public education during this period
probably helped the "melting pot" to function, and exposed groups from different
national backgrounds to the civic structure and related aspects of the United States.
Each of these arguments suggests that private spending on education
contributes to a public good. If parents ignore the externalities associated with
education in deciding how much to spend on their child's education, education6
spending will fall below the socially efficient level. Public policies designed to increase
educational attainment therefore have some prospect for raising social welfare.
A second potential rationale for government intervention arises because minors,
who are the usual recipients of education, are not responsible for deciding how much
schooling they will obtain. This responsibility falls to their parents, who also bear the
coats of education. Since the benefits of education accrue primarily to the children
who receive it, the level of spending on education depends critically on the degree of
parental altruism. if parents place a low value on improvements in their childrens'
future earning potential, then they may underinvest in their children, and government
intervention might be justified on the ground that it protects children from decisions
by their parents.1
One difficulty with this argument is that it could be invoked to justify state
intervention in virtually all aspects of child rearing. Can parents be trusted to feed
their children properly? To provide the appropriate amount and type of playthings and
other stimuli to early development? It is not clear, as West (1970) notes, that the risk
of parental underprovision of education is any greater than the risk of underprovision
o many other important developmental inputs.
A third market imperfection that may be relevant for education decisions
11t is at least possible that some parents may be more concerned with their
children than a social planner would be. Parents may also misperceive the value of
spending on their children, measured in terms of the corresponding increment to
future income or utility, or be concerned primarily with the relative status of their
children, as discussed in Frank (1995). Any of these factors might lead to over-
provision of private education.7
involves capital market constraints. If some households face borrowing constraints
that limit their total access to credit or cause them to face borrowing rates above the
economy-wide marginal product of capital, then even parents whose altruism matched
that of the social planner might underinvest in their children. Because loans to obtain
education are not backed by tangible collateral, they are often difficult to obtain in
private credit markets.
A fourth market imperfection, one that applies most strongly in small
communities with a limited number of children to educate, is the presence of fixed
costs in educational production. The marginal cost of adding another student to a
classroom is lower than the average cost of each student's education. Such economy
of scale arguments, which may also apply to consumption of some types of
specialized services in large school districts, provide an efficiency argument for group
consumption of educational services. This does not necessarily imply that the pubflc
sector must provide education.
Although it is relatively easy to construct a list of imperfections in the market
for educational services, it is extremely difficult to quantify their importance. How
many parents, for example, would neglect their childrens' education? Moreover, while
there are undeniably some externalities associated with education, primary and
secondary education also yield very high private returns. The central question is
therefore whether there are externalities associated with education above the level
that parents would choose in a private market. Yet virtually none of the empirical
evidence on the economic returns to education is directed at this issue.8
Optimal government policy must balance the gains associated with the partial
or complete correction of market failures against the costs of the policy and its
associated distortions. Virtually any government intervention, whether through price
subsidies or through public production of services, distorts behavior. Peltzman (1973)
and Sonstelie (1982) are among the small group of studies that have explored the
inetficiencies created by the current policy of free public provision of education.
Peltzman (1973) shows that free public schools distort parental choice, and lead some
parents who would otherwise have chosen schools better than their local public
schools to send their children to those schools. This is because lower quality, but
free, public schools may on balance be more attractive to parents than hipher quality
schools for which they must pay tuition.
Sonsteiie (1982) also concludes that there is a significant efficiency cost to free
public schools, but his argument relies heavily on his assumption that private schools
are more efficient providers of educational services than their public school
counterparts.2 Neither of these studies considers the potential costs associated with
public rather than private production of education services. Further work on the
private demand for education is important for evaluating a number of current
educational reform proposals, such as those for school vouchers and other means of
introducing more competition into the educational marketplace.
21t is difficult to control for the differences in the attributes of public and private
school students in making such efficiency comparisons. Even if private schools
appear to be more efficient when they are educating only a small and self-selected
part of the population, they could be no more efficient than exiting public schools if
their student input was the same.9
1.2 Market Failures with Respect to Health Care
While potential market failures with respect to education center on externality
issues, those with respect to health care focus on information. Arrow's (19631
seminal analysis emphasizes several potential sources of market imperfection,
including asymettric information between consumers and providers of health care
services as well as uncertainty about current and future needs for medical services.
Uncertainty leads individuals to demand health insurance, and raises the question of
whether the insurance market satisfies the conditions of perfect competition. Health
care suppliers may also be imperfectly competitive, creating a further potential market
failure.
The first potential difficulty with the health care market arises trom the IlmiteC
information that patients possess about the benefits associated with various medical
treatments. The effects of most treatments are random to some degree, and patients
are not well equpped to evaluate the relevant information on treatment effects.
Individuals rarely confront the same major illness several times, so there is little
opportunity to acquire information about the relative performance of different
treatment regimens. Moreover, since purchasing medical care typically involves
purchasing the services of an expert, quality evaluation is critical but very difficult.3
Combining information from many different patients is problematic because of
potential differences in their presenting conditions, so consumers may have no
3Richard Zeckhauser also notes that most medical care is a 'preclusive good."
Choosing to have an operation performed by one physician effectively precludes other
physicians from performing this procedure.10
objective measures of physician quality. These factors suggest that patients may not
make rational choices about which health care services to consume.
The unpredictable nature of many medical expenses, which leads to a demand
for insurance, gives rise to a separate set of market imperfections. Risk averse
individuals can raise their expected utility by purchasing actuarially fair medical
inurance. But once they have insurance that shares in the cost of their medical
outlays, their demand for medical care will be distorted because they no longer face
the full cost of their health care services. The resulting moral hazard problem can
impair the functioning of insurance market and leads private insurers to offer less than
full insurance.
A related problem with the private medical insurance market turns on adverse
selection in purchasing population. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1980)
have shown that when potential insurance buyers are heterogeneous, adverse
selection can lead to the disappearance of the markets for some types of insurance,
hence to market failure. The government has an important advantage relative to
private insurers in creating health insurance policies: it can compel individuals to
participate. Compulsion enables the government to insure everyone at the actuarially
fair rate for the entire population.
There are other potential imperfections in the private health care market. Most
medical services are not supplied under perfectly competitive conditions. Many
hospitals and some specialized physicians may be monopolists in their local markets,
there may be collusion among the various doctors in an area, and there are a range11
of government subsidies to the production of health care professionals that cause
deviations from standard efficiency conditions. Externalities may also arise in the
consumption of medical care. Although small for most kinds of health care services,
such externalities are present with respect to innoculation against infectious diseases
and potentially with some other types of care as well.
In the health care market, as with education, it is easier to list potential market
imperfections than to quantify their substantive importance or to link them to potential
market interventions. For example, while the 1994 Economic Reoort of the President
cites evidence that a non-trivial fraction of medical procedures are not medically
necessary, it is not clear that these procedures are the result of informational or other
problems. While many analysts agree that there are imperfections in the health
insurance market, and as Aaron (1994) notes, private insurers have evolved a variety
of devices such as experience rating, coverage waiting periods, and exclusions of pr-
existing conditions to address adverse selection problems, quantitative evidence on
the substantive consequences of adverse selection remains elusive.
The vast majority of U.S. citizens currently obtain health insurance in prtvate
markets. A significant number of the uninsured have access to insurance, but choose
not to purchase it.4 Long and Marquis (1992) show that low-wage, part-time
workers are particularly unlikely to purchase employer-provided insurance. They
4Adverse selection may lead insurers to offer some kinds of policies at very high
loads relative to their actuarial risk. Even if consumers could in principle buy such
policies, but do not, there may be a case for government intervention to improvethe
workings of such markets. Thus the availability of an insurance policy per se does not
indicate that adverse selection is not a problem.12
observe that one reason small firms with substantial numbers of such workers do not
offer health insurance may be that their workers do not demand such coverage. There
is virtually no empirical evidence inking various types of market failure to the health
care utilization decisions of households.
2. Redistributive Arguments for Government Provision of Education nd Health Care
While efficiency concerns are one rationale for public policies that intervene in
the markets for education and health care, they are not the sole or even the primary
rationale for existing programs.5 Redistributive concerns also play an important role.
With respect to both education and health care, many subscribe to what Tobin (1970)
labelled "specific egalitarianism:" the view that access to these services should not
be conditioned or income. This section explores the redistributive arguments for
government intervention in these markets in more detail.
At the outset, one must ask why redistribution should be linked to particular
goods, rather than carried out with income transfers. Since the utility gain from
transferring a given bundle of goods to a recipient is always less than the recipient's
gain from receiving the cash value of these goods, there is a strongpriori argument
for separating redistribution from the provision of particular goods.
While this argument applies for each recipient, it may not apply to a transfer
5Zeckhauser (1986), in an essay that explores issues similar to those raised here,
concludes that "only a small portion of [the vast subsidies and directpayments for
health care and educationi can be justified primarily on the basis that they provide
public goods or remedy market failures.(p.47)"13
program as a whole. There are a number of reasons why in-kind programs or
subsidies to the consumption of particular goods can be more efficient than income
redistribution, even when the consumption of particular goods does not generate
externalities. First, in-kind transfers may be better than comparable cash transfers at
channelling resources to a target population. Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982 and
Besley and Coate (1991) argue that in-kind programs may help the government to
distinguish the truly needy from other potential program beneficiaries. Second, in-kind
programs may be attractive policies when policy-makers seek to impose their
preferences on individuals.In education, for example, public policies specify the
amount of schooling a child must receive.
A fina' explanation for the use of in-kind rather than cash redistribution is
pohtical, rather than economic. More political coalitions support in-kind programs than
equivalent spending on cash transfers, because in-kind goods and services are
supplied by identifiable industries. Thus, there are interest groups that benefit from
in-kind redistribution. Teachers and health care professionals may support expanded
government transfers in their respective markets, even if they do not support
expanded income redistribution in general.6 West (1967, 1970) argues that even if
public provision of education was needed in the United States in the mid-nineteenth
century to overcome a lack of infrastructure for delivering educational services, it was
not needed for long. West (1967) identifies support from several organized interest
Doctors, however, opposed the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, on
the grounds that these programs were the first steps to socialized medicine.14
groups, including teachers, as essential to the continued growth of public schools.
2.1 Redistributive Concerns and Education
Providing "equal opportunity" is one of the objectives of current policies with
respect to education. Since parental resources are unequal, even if parents value their
children's lifetime utility in the same way as the social planner and face welt-
functioning capital markets, there will be differences in the level of education that
children would receive in a private market for education. Such differences may
translate into differences in lifetime earning opportunities, which some argue against
as unfair because they are beyond the childrens' control. The public sector must
therefore ensure access to adequate education for all, either by supplying a basic
educational services package, or through a system of income-linked subsidies of the
price of education. Zeckhauser (1986) notes that equality can be defined in many,
sometimes inconsistent, ways: equality of the price at which different households can
purchase a given service, equality of the quantity of service consumed by different
households, and equality of the outcome of service consumption are three examples.
In the United States, public education has historically been a responsibility of
local government, although there has been a trend in the last half century toward
greater centralization of finance at the state rather than the local level. For the 1990-
91 school year, local revenue sources accounted for 46.5% of public spending on
primary and secondary education, compared with 47.3% from state governments and
6.2% from the federal government (Digest of Eductipnpl Statistics. 1993, Table15
156). In 1947-48, local governments provided 57.9% of the money, while two
decades earlier, in 1929-30, the local share was 82.7%.
Local financing raises important qualifications to the redistributive power of
public spending on education. Because communities differ in their tax bases and their
willingness to impose taxes, there is substantial variation across places in spending
levels. Although a number of court decisions during the last three decades have
weakened the link between educational spending and property taxes on the grounds
that the property tax base is highly unequal across communities, disparities across
jurisdictions remain. Wealthy communities spend more on schools than poorer
communities, so the existing system of locally-provided education is not as
redistributive as it would be if a higher level of government were the primary service
provider.
Since the incidence of local taxes is primarily on the residents of local
jurisdictions, at least when individuals are free to move, local public provision of
education is tantamount to taxing all residents of a jurisdiction to pay for the average
level of educational consumption in the community. This policy can redistribute
resources within a community, but it is a weak device for redistributing resources
between those in different communities. Milton Friedman 1962) argues that the
present combination of local government provision of education and reliance onlocal
property tax finance makes it more difficult for low-income families to purchase high-
quality education. This is because consuming high-quality public education usually
requires purchasing an expensive house in a school district with high-quality schools.16
This can require a much greater outlay of resources than simply purchasing higher
quality education.
2.2 Redistribution and the Government's Role in Health Care
"Specific egalitarianism" also applies to universal access to health care. The
reôent health care debate provides many examples of policy-makers and political
leaders who believe that access to adequate health care should not be conditioned on
ability to pay, and there seems to be substantial popular support for this view.
Whether the stronger claim, that those with higher incomes should Li have access
to better care than those with low incomes, commands support is less clear. In any
event, redistributive objectives play a central part in the design of government health
care policy. Gornick et at. (1985) report that in 1963, on the eve of Medicare's
passage, only 56% of those aged 65 + had health insurance. The insurance rate for
younger age groups was substantially greater, even though the need for medical care
was greater among the elderly population, and this was one of the factors contributing
to support for Medicare.
Government policies to subsidize health insurance and health care redistribute
along at least two dimensions. First, as with most redistributive programs, such
subsidies transfer resources to those with relatively low incomes. However, the with
respect to medical care one must also distinguish between the ex ante value of
government insurance, before learning about a household's medical needs, and the
value of the insurance, after such needs are observed. The second aspect of17
redistribution within government health programs is a transfer from those who do not
require much medical assistance to those who do. Because health outlays are highly
concentrated, with estimates for 1994 suggesting that 20.3% of all health spending
will be accounted for by the 1.6% of the population with more than $30,000 in
spending, and 51.3% of spending will be done by the 8.1% of the population with
more than $10,000 iii health care outlays, the second form of redistribution can be
quite important.'
Even if government subsidies to health insurance were not age-related, the age-
specific pattern of medical care demand would lead such subsidies to redistribute to
the elderly. The current structure of health care programs in the United States, with
eligibility for Medicare conditioned on reaching age 65, accentuates this redistribution.
Such policies both raise the standard of living of elderly households, and they also
may reduce the financial and other burdens on the children of the elderly who would
otherwise need to de/ote attention and resources to their care.8
The intergenerational pattern of benefits associated with medical care for the
elderly is an important but relatively unexplored issue, and one that rriay be critical to
7Economic Report of the President, 1994, p. 143. These statistics include all
medical care spending, including preventative, routine, and acute care. Spending on
acute caie is even more concentrated, with Aaron (1 995) reporting that five percent
of the population accounting for more than half of the outlays in a given year.
Davis and Schoen (1978) explicitly mention reduced burdens on middle-aged
children of elderly households as one of the benefits of Medicare. Cutler and Sheirier
(1994) show that government provision of nursing home care displaces a substantial
amount of care that would otherwise have been provided by children.18
explaining the political support for these programs.9 Most individuals in middle-age
have surviving parents. For example, Himes (1994) shows that for a 35 year old
white woman in 1 987, the probability that she had two living parents was
approximately .60. The probability that she had at least one living parent was greater
than .90, substantially higher than the probability that she had at least one child (.81).
The probability that a white woman has at least one living parent does not fall below
one half until she reaches her early 50s. Thus altruism from children to parents can
explain political support among middle-aged individuals with respect to health care
policy for the elderly. It is also possible that part of the increased taxes required to
finance such benefits will be offset by higher bequests from parents who received
transfers and therefore did not have to spend-down their wealth during retirement.
3. The Choice of Instruments: Subsidies, Mandates. & Government Provision
Why is the nature of government involvement in education and health care so
different? In the health care market the government plays a largely financial role,
purchasing health care services provided by the private market, while iii the niarket
for educational services, it is the single largest supplier of the service in question.
This section considers the structure of public sector interventions in private markets,
given that there is a market failure or redistributive justification for some market
This question may be even more central to analyzing public support for provision
of nursing home care rather than medical care.19
intervention.
The basic criterion that a social planner would use to choose a means of market
intervention is clear: select that policy which provides the highest level of social
welfare. In practice, policy choices involve important political aspects which may
dwarf direct social welfare concerns. Suppressing political considerations for the
moment, this section considers the factors that determine the relative merits of
different policy instruments.
The choice among various alternatives depends not only on the market failure
that motivates government intervention in private markets, but also on the costs of
different methods of intervention and the capacity of government officials to obtain
the information needed for successful intervention. These latter concerns suggest
that even if there is a market failure, it may be optimal for the government aQI to
intervene because the cost of government action would exceed the gains from
remedying market failure. This possibility, "government failure," has been discussed
by McKean and Minasian (1966) and Wolf (1986).
This section compares price subsidies, government mandates, and direct
government service provision. It discusses the advantages and disadvantages of
each. The next section describes actual polices toward education and h'lth cr in
the United States, and asks whether the various considerations described below cw
explain the structure of current policies.20
3.1 Price Subsidies
The textbook remedy for externalities that are not reflected in private choices
is a "Pigouvian tax" that alters the price individuals face, so that their private choices
will yield the socially efficient level of consumption. In practice, a range of public
policies are available to alter the private cost of purchasing services such as education
and medical care. These include tax subsidies, direct subsidies such as Medicare that
involve government financing of most or all service consumption, and incentives to
the production of services, such as grants to medical schools or interest-free loans for
medical students.
The efficacy of price subsidies depends critically on the price elasticity of
demand for the subsidized service. When this elasticity is low, when there is
uncertainty about this elasticity, or when there is a wide divergence across
households in this elasticity, then price subsidies may be an unattractive form of
market intervention. Weitzman (1974) develops an argument of this form in his
comparison of "prices vs. quantities" as alternative means of regulation.
There is no consensus on the empirical magnitude of the price elasticities of
demand for education and medical care. Studies of the demand for education
typically compare local public spending in different towns, and invoke the median
voter model to argue that the each town's spending is the level demanded by the
town's median voter. There are many potential difficulties with this apptoach,
including the potential influence of political institutions such as Proposition 13 on local
spending, and the problem of modelling the choice of local spending when21
jurisdictions are imperfectly competitive. Studies of this type usually yield relatively
small estimates of the price elasticity of demand; Sonstelie's (1982) study of
California, for example, suggests a value -.16.
In the medical care market, the central problem is the potential endogeneity of
health insurance, which has an important effect on the net price of medical care
services. Some of the most convincing empirical evidence to date on the price
elasticity of demand for medical care is based on the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment, a systematic social experiment that was conducted in four cities during
the mid-1970s.In analyzing the resulting data, Keeler et l, (1988) report an
elasticity of demand for total medical care of -.22 for households facing copayment
rates of greater than 25 percent. The estimated demand elasticity for well-patient
care is greater, -.43, while the elasticity for hospital care is -.14.
Specific egalitarianism with respect to health care does not imply that all
individuals should consume the same amount of medical care; some people need very
little care in a given year. Rather, it implies equality of access, so that conditional on
need, individuals have the same opportunity to receive care. This suggests that from
the standpoint of public policy, a key parameter is the price elasticity of insurance
demand rather than medical care demand. The demand for insurance is substantially
more price sensitive than the demand for health care. Gruber and Poterba (1994)
present evidence, based on changes in tax incentives for insurance purchase in the
1980s, suggesting that the price elasticity of insurance demand is hetw'n -1 ind-7
These estimates, which are based on the effects within several years around a tax22
reform that reduced the after-tax cost of insurance for the self-employed, may
somewhat overstate the long-run elasticity of demand for insurance. They are
nevertheless consistent with earlier studies using different methodologies, which also
suggest large price effects on insurance demand.
These elasticity estimates suggest that price subsidies may have substantial
effects on the demand for health insurance, they are not likely to have large effects
on the consumption of education. This has direct implications for the choice of policy
instrument: price subsidies to education may not be very successful in altering the
quantity of services in the private market.
The principal advantage of price subsidies is that they preserve individual choice
in selecting service providers and the level of services to be consumed. Such choice
permits individuals to search for goods and services with qualities or other attributes
that are weU suited to their needs. If there is substantial heterogeneity in household
tastes, then allowing individual choice can have a substantial positive effect on
consumer welfare.1° The difficult case arises when recognizing this heterogeneity
may exacerbate the market failures or inequality that public policy is designed to
address.
One drawback with price subsidies is that they create incentives for households
to re-categorize non-subsidized expenditures in an attempt to qualify them for the
subsidy. This problem, the dual of the tax collection problem in which taxpayers
°This argument presumes that consumers are capable of making rational demand
decisions, an assumption that may not hold with respect to some aspects of medical
care.23
redefine taxable income into non-taxable forms, has two consequences. First, it
means that the revenue cost of a price subsidy may be greater than the subsidy rate
times the actual amount of the subsidized activity. Second, and significantly if the
government's objective is to ensure that everyone consumes a minimal service level,
the private market may create "sham transactions" that qualify for the price subsidy
but do not achieve the government's goals.
Education illustrates the potential problem with sham transactions. If parents
received subsidies for school spending, but "schools" were not well defined for this
purpose, one could imagine a range of service providers who would comingle services
for parents with educational services. Schools might, for example, organize family
field trips that were of value to parents as well as children, and include the cost of
these trips in tuition charges. The ease or difficulty of monitoring such sham
transactions affects the desirability of using price subsidies to encourage service
consumption.
Two additional problems deserve mention when subsidies are enacted as part
of the tax system, as they are with some aspects of health care. First, because
marginal tax rates are progressive, a subsidy that operates by allowing individuals to
deduct certain expenditures from taxable income will have a larger marginal effect on
the price paid by high- than by low-income households. Second, the effective subsidy
rate in this case is affected by changes in the income tax system, changes which may
bear no relation to changes in the rate of subsidy that is suggested by market failure
considerations.24
.2 Government Mandates
One alternative to price subsidies is a government mandate of that aH
households purchase a particular good or service. The recent discussion of "individual
mandates" in the health reform debate provides an example: individuals would be
required to purchase health insurance satisfying some criteria, but these policies could
be purchased in the private market. Current requirements that employers purchase
workers compensation insurance, and that children receive certain vaccinations before
beginning elementary school, are examples of goverment mandates.
The primary advantage of mandates is that they ensure universal consumption,
and they can be tailored to directly control levels of consumption. By mandating that
all children in Certain age groups attend an accredited elementary or secondary school,
the government achieves at least one measure of equality in educational consumption.
When concerns about equity in outcomes rather than opportunity motivate policies,
mandates may be attractive policy instruments. Mandates can be open-ended,
requiring all individuals to consume at least a certain amount of a service, or they may
be closed-ended, specifying precisely the good or service that is to be consumed. The
latter achieves a greater degree of equality across individuals, at the welfare cost of
denying individual choice.
It is important to contrast the effects of price subsidies with the effect of
government mandates in the framework suggested by Weitzman (1974). With price-
based instruments, at least ex ante, it is difficult to assess the quantityresponse to
a policy. This makes such instruments unattractive in situations where there are25
substantial benefits to particular levels of service consumption, as might be the case
with some levels of education or some types of innoculations. Mandates, with or
without public service provision, solve this problem because they specify the level of
service consumption, but they impose ex ante unknown costs on many individuals and
firms.
A secondary advantage of mandates, which can be very important in the
political economy of policy design, is that they can be designed to impose costs on
individuals or firms without affecting government budgets.In times of fiscal
stringency, such as the present, mandates may be particularly attractive to
policymakers because they provide a mechanism for affecting real activity without
spending money. Some popular discussions of public policy appear to exhibit
confusion about the relationship between taxes and mandates, and there appears to
be more political opposition to new taxes than to new mandates with economically
equivalent effects. This is one of the reasons that mandates played a central role in
the recent discussion of health care reform.
Mandates require a well-functioning private market for the mandated good or
service if they are to succeed. Mandating that consumers purchase a service that is
supplied under conditions of imperfect competition, for example, may have less
favorable effects on social welfare than mandating purchase of a service that is
competitively supplied. This issue arises with respect to health insurance mandates:
if one of the market failures in health insurance is that adverse selection leads to
missing insurance markets, a mandate without government insurance provision may26
be ineffective.
The economic analysis of government mandates is not as well developed as the
analysis of taxes and price subsidies, but several points about the efficiency
consequences of mandates nevertheless deserve mention.First, by mandating
minimum levels of consumption but not altering the price of services for those who
want to consume more than the mandate level, open-ended mandates avoid distorting
the behavior of higher-consumption households. Summers (1989) emphasizes this
point in his discussion of employer mandates. Second, assuming that individuals must
pay to satisfy the mandate either by purchasing the mandated good or service, or
through reduced wages if the mandate affects employers11, then a mandate is a
form of "benefit tax." The welfare cost of the mandate depends on the difference
between the amount the individual values the mandated good and the cost of
purchasing this good. At least in some cases, the efficiency cost of a mandate can
be substantially smaller than the efficiency cost of tax-financed government provision
of the service. Mandates may therefore be attractive in situations where total private
spending on a good is large, but the government wants to increase this spending
without transferring all of the initial outlays into the government sector.
11Gruber (1994 summarizes previous work, and presents new evidence on, how
wages adjust to government mandates that firms provide certain benefits to their
workers. When mandates apply only to a sub-group of employees, wages may
decline for some workers who do not benefit from the mandate, and they may not
decline by the full amount of the mandate's cost for some workers who do benefit.27
3.3 Public Provision
A third means of encouraging consumption of particular services involves direct
public production. This could be combined either with a regime in which service
recipients do not pay, arid costs of production are covered through tax revenues, as
with education, or with a regime in which consumers are charged when they purchase
government produced goods and services. The Government Printing Office and state
universities are examples of the latter system. Government production can be, but
need not be, coupled with a mandate for consumption.
Public provision differs from price subsidies and mandates in that it gives
government greater control over the nature of the services individuals consume. This
can also be achieved in the other cases by regulating the product that is subsidized
or mandated, but in some cases the costs of regulation may make this an
unacceptable strategy.ri the case of education, for example, one reason for
substantial government production may be the difficulty of specifying a required
school curriculum for non-government providers, although the existence of accredited
private schools raises some question about this explanation. Public provision can also
be a device for restricting potentially wasteful private competition among consumers,
which Frank (1995) suggests may apply to some extent with respect to educational
and other services consumed by middle- and upper-income households.
Government control may also be important when distributional issues that might
be difficult to resolve in the private sector arise in the allocation of services. in
education, for example, there may be important externalities across children within a28
classroom or school.'2 How would the private market handle the disruptive child
who imposes negative externalities on other children? Possibly by excluding him from
the school, or by charging him a premium to attend school. If these responses seem
unacceptable to notions of justice or equal opportunity, it may be necessary for the
government to control the production process.
A distinct reason for government provision of some services is that profit-
making enterprises may place their bottom lines ahead of concerns about quality or
appropriateness of service, undermining public confidence jr-i their services. In such
situations, non-profit providers may emerge or the public sector may assume
responsibility for service delivery.'3 At a time when public confidence in government
seems very low, however, it is difficult to know whether consumers would prefer a
for-profit hospital, which may deliver services they don't need but that generate
profits, or a public hospital, which may deliver low-quality versions of services they
do need.
There are several arguments against public service provision. One is that the
government is characterized by "production inefficiency" as a service provider. There
have been numerous studies of the relative efficiency of public and private provision,
'2The extent of peer group effects and within-classroom externalities in the
educational process is controversial. For example, Henderson, Mieskowski, and
Sauvageau (1978) find positive externalities from being exposed to high-achievement
students; other studies find weaker results.
'3Non-profit providers avoid the charge of profit-maximization service delivery, but
they may also be subject to some of the production inefficiencies that may
characterize public production. Hansmann (1995) discusses the role of non-profits in
health and education, and outlines potential sources of inefficiency in their operation.29
surveyed for example by Vining and Boardman (1993). These studies, whilenot
conclusive or uniform, suggest that government production is less efficient than
private production, although the comparison between government production aridnon-
profit production, common in education and health care, is less clear. Bureaucrats
who do not face the discipline of a competitive marketmay make inefficient choices
with respect to factor inputs and their choice of output.
A brief summary of the state of research comparing efficiency atpublic and
private health care facilities illustrates the lack of consensus. Lindsay (1976)
compares various measures related to productivity at VA and private hospitals. The
findings are mixed: lengths of stay for given procedures are longer at VA hospitals,
but the staff-to-patient ratios are also significantly lower, in contrast to the inefficient
input hypothesis. Becker and Sloan (1985) analyze data from the American Hospital
Association's 1979 Survey of Hospitals on for-profit, non-profit, andgovernment
hospitals. They do not find any pronounced differences in hospital costs across forms
of ownership. Schulz, Greenley, and Peterson (1984)compare the costs of public and
private mental health services, and contrary to the earlier hospital studies, they find
substantially lower costs for private sector providers. The existing literature on
hospital costs is not conclusive, but it is far richer than the literature on the costs of
public versus private education. Further work on the relative efficiency of different
forms of ownership in both health and education is therefore is needed to judge the
costs of public production of services.
A second disadvantage to public provision is the absence of any objective30
standard for which services should be provided. For a profit-maximizing firm, services
that generate profits will be provided. But for a tax-supported public institution, there
are no such guidelines, and there is a resulting risk of over-provision of services, or
providing the wrong services.
A third disadvantage, which applies when publicly-provided services are tax-
financed, involves the efficiency cost of raising revenue. If total government spending
to provide a given set services is C, but this amount is raised through taxes, then the
cost imposed on the private sector is (1 +A)C, where A is the marginal deadweight loss
of raising tax revenue. For the current United States tax system as a whole,
estimates suggest a value of A near .30. Ballard, Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (1985)
provide support for this estimate. This efficiency cost of taxation compounds the
efficiency lost in the production process.
4. Mixing & Matching Instruments: Current Policy Toward Education & Health Care
Actual government intervention in the markets for education and health care
involves each of the three policy instruments described above. This section describes
the nature and evolution of government policies in both of these areas, and then tries
to evaluate whether efficiency considerations, redistributive objectives, or other
factors explain the nature of observed policies.
4.1 Government Involvement in Markets for Education
Public provision as well as mandates and price subsidies are evident in the31
market for education. Local governments are direct suppliers of most primary and
secondary educational services. Yet with respect to pre-elementary education (child
care), the government's role as a provider is limited. There are some price subsidies
to consumers, and some regulations on private market providers, in higher education,
there are price subsidies through a variety of student loan programs, which also
alleviate capital market constraints, but state governments are also direct producers
of higher educational services.
Before describing policies toward primary and secondary education, it is
important to note that it is difficult to separate child care and education on any ripri
basis. There is evidence that much of a child's performance in school is predictable
from his or her preparation for elementary school, i.e., from what would traditionally
be labelled "child care." This sub-section therefore describes government policies
toward child care as well as primary, secondary, and higher education.
The vast majority of care for children under the age of 5 is provided in the home
and/or by relatives. In 1991, 30.3% of children were cared for at home by a relative,
5.7% at home by a nonrelative, 13.1% in another home by a relative, 17.9% in
another home by a non-relative, and 23% were cared for in an organized child care
facility.14 The majority (62%) of the 2.9 million children enrolled in nursery school
programs were in private sector programs. Thus the overwhelming majority of care
for children who are not yet old enough to attend elementary school was provided
14The remaining children were cared for in a variety of other arrangements. Data
are based on the Survey of Income and Program Participation, as reported in the U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports P70-30.32
either by the private market, or through non-market transactions within families or
other social groups.
Child care for children in families where both parents work, or where a single
parent works, is partly subsidized by the federal income tax code. The Child Care
Credit provides a credit of 30% of child care costs for families with Adjusted Gross
Incomes (AGIs) of less than $10,000, and phases down to a credit rate of 20% for
those with AGIs of more than $28,000. The maximum amount of expenditures to
which the credit can be applies is limited to $2400 for families with one child, and
$4800 for families with two or more children. There is also a federal tax provision
that allows employees to pay for some child care expenses using dependent care
accounts, which are offerred by some employers as part of cafeteria plan benefits.
These accounts are more valuable than the child care credit for high-income
households, but the total federal revenue loss associated with these accounts is small.
There is a sharp contrast between government involvement in the markets for
child care and education. Most primary and secondary educational services in the
United States are publicly-provided. In 1991, 90.7% of elementary and secondary
school students were enrolled in public schools, and per student expenditure averaged
$4622. At the college level, the public sector role is weaker but still strong: 78.7%
of college students are enrolled in public colleges (see the 1993 Stptistical Abstract
of the United States, Table 228). Real public spending has increased during the last
three decades, due both to the rising real costs of educational inputs and to increased
inputs per student. Hanushek and Rivkin (1994) report that the pupil-teacher ratio in33
U.S. schools, for example, has declined from 26.3 in 1950 to 20.5 in 1970 to 15.4
in 1990.
Table 1 presents data on the estimated cost of various governmentprograms
that affect children, as compiled by the Congressional Budget Office, augmented with
information on state and local educational spending. The table includes information
on outlays for programs that are targetted only to preschoolers, such as Head Start
and other compensatory education programs, as well as the share of broader
programs, such as Food Stamps and Medicaid, that is received by children. The table
shows that with the exception of spending on primary and secondary education, most
of the programs targetted at children are relatively small. Moreover, most of these
programs are targetted at children in poverty. The child care tax credit and the
dependent care allowance are two of the few that are available to children in families
above the poverty line.15
In light of the substantial flow of tax revenue to primary and secondary
education in the United States, it is natural to ask whether concerns about market
failure, a desire for redistribution, or other factors stimulated government support for
education. The start of public education in the United States can be traced to a 1647
law of the Massachusetts Bay Colony directing any town with at least fifty families
to hire a teacher, and any town with at least one hundred families to support a
15This situation contrasts sharply with that in some European countries, where
governments provide child care to a substantial fraction of households. Ohlsson and
Rosen (1994) report that in Sweden, 57 percent of pre-school children were in public
day care in 1 992, while a very high fraction of the rest were home with parents who
were on paid parental leave.34
grammar school that could prepare young men to attend a university.The
introduction of this law, reproduced in Johnson et al. (1986), does not suggest
concern with either market failure or redistribution:
It being one chiefe project of y ould deluder, Satan, to keepe
men from the knowledge of y Scriptures, ... evy towneship in this
jurisdiction ... shall appoint one within their towne to teach all
such children as shall resort to him to write and read ... (p.252).
While legislative language is not always a reliable guide to the factors that led to
passage of a law, it may nevertheless be informative. This passage suggests a
paternalistic desire to educate children. This was complemented by a concern that
without schools, the Massachusetts Bay Colony would not be able to ensure a future
supply of ministers.
The Massachusetts law was a model for public school legislation in other New
England colonies, but it did not diffuse throughout the United States until the
nineteenth century. In the South, for example, with large plantations and few towns
with critical population mass, schooling for the children of wealthy planters was
usually provided by private tutors.In the Middle Atlantic states, the school
environment in the years following settlement involved a collection of private schools,
many with religious affiliations. These states received many immigrants in the
nineteenth century, and the growth of public schools in these states was justified in
large part on the argument that such schools would facilitate assimilation of recent
immigrants. Redistributive concerns did not appear to play an important role. The
current concern about equality of access arose after public schools were well35
established in the United States.1
The evolution of public high schools in the United States also suggests that
redistributive concerns were not central. When public high schools first became
popular in the late 1 800s, their incidence was regressive. Only the children of middle
and upper income families could afford to remain in school beyond the elementary
level, so they were the primary beneficiaries of these schools. Over time, the extent
of participation in these schools grew, but similar arguments about regressive benefits
have been applied to publicly-financed colleges and universities in the post-war
period.17
The heavy reliance on local government provision of education in the United
States, which contrasts with the situation in many Western European democracies,
also undermines the importance of redistribution as an explanation for public provision
of education. Because local governments depended heavily on the local property tax
base for their revenue stream, different towns even within small metropolitan areas
have historically devoted very different levels of resources to their public schools.
4.2 Government Involvement in the Market for Medical Cpre
Government involvement in the market for medical care is even more diverse
16West (1 967, 1 970) describes the expansion of publicly-provided education in the
United States, emphasizing the role of a growing education bureaucracy in expanding
the public sector's role.
17Hansen and Weisbrod (1 969) present evidence suggesting that the net benefits
of the University of California system are greater for high than for low-income
households.36
than that with respect to child care and education. The federal government's
Medicare and Medicaid programs involve substantial government financing for private
purchases of health care, while the Veterans' Administration and many state and local
governments operate a network of hospitals. Unlike teachers, however, most health
care professionals work for private firms or non-profit institutions, although they are
often subject to substantial government regulation.
Direct government spending on health services and supplies totalled $368
billion in 1992, 45.5% of total health care outlays (Congressional Budget Office
(1 992)). The government's spending share was substantially greater for hospital care
and nursing home services. Government funds also represented more than sixty
percent of the costs of medical research and medical facilities construction.
The government's share of the aggregate health care budget has grown
substantially in the last three decades. In 1965, government spending accounted for
24.7% of health care outlays in the United States, with state and local governments
accounting for more than half of this total (13.2%). Since the enactment of Medicare
and Medicaid in 1965, however, the federal government's role has increased. Federal
spending accounted for 31.3% of all health care outlays in 1992, compared with 28%
a decade earlier. Projections suggest even more rapid growth in the government's role
in the future, as a consequence of both demographic change and continued growth
in the relative cost of health care services.
Table 2 reports direct government spending on health care, as well as foregone
revenue associated with several tax expenditures, for 1992. The single largest37
program supporting health care services is Medicare, which accounted tot inure tliii
$130 billion and is projected to increase to more than $250 billion by the end of this
decade. There are also substantial foregone revenues associated with the tax
expenditures for health insurance ($45 billion), as well as substantial tax expenditures
from the federal income tax deduction for medical expenditures in excess of 7.5% of
adjusted gross income, and deductions for charitable contributions to health care
institutions. Direct government spending on health care is substantially less important
than federal payments for health care from others. Federal outlays on the Veterans
Administration health system, for example, were $14 billion in 1992, or 6.3% of total
federal spending on health care.
The Medicare program has two parts. The first, Medicare Part A, provides
hospital insurance for the elderly. This component of Medicare is funded with the
revenues from a payroll tax on most employed workers, so it involves explicit
intergenerational redistribution. Medicare Part B, or Supplementary Medical Insurance
(SMI), provides insurance for outpatient services at hospitals and the costs of
physician visits. SMI is an pDtional insurance program, and elderly individuals who
choose to participate pay premiums that represent roughly one quarter of the cost of
this insurance. The balance of the cost is financed from general revenues. Since all
elderly individuals are eligible for the same benefits under Medicare, this aspect of the
program redistributes from high- to low-income elderly households. However,
Medicare is financed with a regressive flat-rate payroll tax, which has an opposite
distributional effect.38
Tax subsidies for the purchase of health insurance and health care are the
government provisions that affect the largest number of health care consumers The
exclusion of health insurance benefits from taxable income, and the tax rules allowing
households to deduct medical expenses in excess of 7.5% of Adjusted Gross Income
when computing taxable income, reduce the price of health care for most taxpayers.
The reduction in the after-tax price of insurance raises insurance coverage among
employed households. While the decision not to tax the value of employer-provided
health insurance was taken with the recognition that this would spur private insurance
coverage, some of the most rapid growth in employer-provision of such insurance
took place during the World War II, when wage controls made it difficult for employers
to raise compensation in other ways.
Tax subsidies may encourage private spending, but they are weak instruments
for redistribution across households. Since marginal tax rates increase with household
income, high-income households receive the largest percentage subsidy to their
purchases of both health insurance and medical care.
Medicaid, the other major government direct outlay program, pays for health
insurance for poor households. The program is administered by the states subject to
federal guidelines. Federal Medicaid spending is the most rapidly growing government
health care outlay, exhibiting an annual growth rate of 15% between 1987 and 1990,
and 28% between 1990 and 1992, although these growth rates are not expected to
persist. A substantial part of the rapid growth in the early 1 990s was due to state
gaming of federal reimbursement rules to maximize federal contribution to the state39
programs.
The history of government intervention in the medical marketplace suggests
that redistributive concerns were the primary motivation for passage of the Social
Security Act Amendments of 1965, which created Medicare and Medicaid. There is
a long political history to the debate on public health insurance in the United States;
see for example Starr (1 982}. A number of European countries, notably Germany and
England, adopted universal health insurance laws in the late 19th and early part of the
20th century. There was active discussion of such proposals just before World War
I in the United States, as part of a battery of policies supported by the Progressives.
Their motivation appeared to be specific egalitarianism, the provision of health
insurance as a basic human right. The outbreak of World War I derailed legislative
interest in these proposals, however, and, facing some opposition from doctors who
did not want government to infringe their professional sovereignty, these proposals
did not attract much attention in the fifteen years after World War I.
The next wave of interest in national health insurance occurred during the New
Deal, when President Roosevelt considered but rejected the idea of including health
insurance in the legislation that became the Social Security Act of 1935. Once again,
opposition from doctors was an important stumbling block. Although FDR never
embraced national health insurance as a critical policy goal, President Truman did, and
in 1948 he launched a major campaign to secure passage of a national health bill.
The American Medical Association, by then a well-organized lobbying group,
undertook an all-out campaign to block passage of this legislation. The debate took40
place during a penod of great concern about Communist influence in the United
States, and the AMA's labelling of the Truman proposals as "socialized medicine' and
linking these proposals to Leninism proved successful in defeating them. The Social
Security Amendments of 1950 did however stipulate that federal matching fjnd
would be provided for medical payments to health care providers for medical care to
those on public assistance. This was a first step toward federal provision of medical
care for the needy, and it was expanded ten years later in the Kerr-Mills Act (1960).
The debate that led to passage of Medicare and Medicaid was joined in the mid-
1 960s, as part of the Great Society program. By this time concern about access to
health care for low-income and elderly households had become acute, in part because
rising health care costs made it more difficult for these groups to obtain care. Only
56% of the elderly had health insurance prior to the passage of Medicare. The critical
political manouever in the Medicare debate was limiting the discussion to health care
for the elderly. The evidence suggesting poorer access to health care for the elderly
than for other age groups was difficult to dispute, and by focusing the program.
objections from the AMA that this would lead to government control of doctors was
blunted. Representative Wilbur Mills combined a Democratic proposal for mandatory
hospital insurance (Medicare Part A) with a Republican proposal for a voluntary
outpatient and physician care program (Medicare Part B) and produced legislation that
was supported by a majority of Congress.
The critical element in the debate leading to Medicare was a distributional
concern with access to health care among specific groups. On this dimension,41
Medicare achieved its objectives. Davis and Schoen (1978) present some evidence
that the ratio of physicians visits per year by those in high income and low income
categories was more equal in 1975 than in 1964, before the passage of Medicare and
Medicaid. The effect was less pronounced for the elderly than foryounqer groups.
To summarize this section, it is difficult to explain either the present structure
of public involvement in education in the United States, or the historical evolution of
the public sector's involvement, using either externality or redistributive arguments.
Redistributive concerns do appear to play a greater role in defining government policy
toward medical care. Concern about market failures in the medical marketplace does
not appear to have played an important role in the rise of publicly-financed medical
care in the United States.
S. The Research Agenda
The questions of whether particular markets y fail, and whether
redistribution could in orinciole be carried out, receive far more discussion among
economists than the questions of whether markets actually fail, whether government
intervention in these markets improves or worsen matters, and whether various
redistributive programs are actually successful. Yet the choice amongst various
policies for government intervention depends on the actual performance of such
policies. This concluding section outlines several areas where further research will
yield high returns in informing the debate on choice of public policies in the fields of
education and health care.42
First, because externalities are invoked to justify intervention in both of these
markets, there is a pressing need to document the magnitude of the externalities,
particularly those associated with consumption of education. It is important in this
regard to assess whether the generation of externalities changes as the level of
consumption changes, i.e., whether primary and secondary education yields laror or
smaller externalities than higher education. If most externalities are generated by
levels of educational input that individuals would choose to obtain without
government subsidy, then the case for public intervention in the educational
marketplace may be much weaker than is commonly believed. More generally, there
is a need to quantify the importance of various imperfections that are listed as
potential problems with the markets for education and health care, and to move
beyond the discussion of reasons that might justify public intervention to reasons that
or do not.
Second, the efficiency of public providers of services, as opposed to that of
private sector providers, requires further attention, since this is a key determinant of
whether governments should "make or buy" services. The range of organizational
forms in the medical care sector -- private hospitals, non-profit hospitals, as well as
state- and federal-government run hospitals -- provides a wealth of data for comparing
input choices and productivity.While many studies of public versus private
production conclude that the public sector is a less efficient producer of various goods
and services, these studies are often contaminated by various selection biases in the
set of services provided by the government. Zeckhauser (1986) argues that in higher43
education, public institutions tend to function more like their nonprofit competitors
than like other government bureaucracies. Further evidence on this issue for primary
and secondary education, and for hospitals, would be valuable.
A third important issue, more concerned with political economy than the
microeconomic analysis of government policy, concerns the basis of political support
for redistributive policies toward children and the elderly. Spending on education
represents redistribution to the young; spending on health care and health insurance
transfers resources to the elderly. A number of commentators, including Preston
(1984) and Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1993), have called attention to the rapid growth
of transfers to the elderly, and the relative decline in society's investment in
children.18 This may reflect more effective political activities of elderly voters than
those who are concerned with children, or it may reflect the fact that more middle
aged households are childless than without living parents. It is also possible that most
middle-aged individuals know that they can expect to live well into their seventies and
eighties, and to benefit from generous policies toward the elderly that are enacted
today. These factors may explain the political reality of growing redistribution toward
the elderly rather than children.
The current policy debates in both education and health care, including the
discussions of school vouchers, increased state financing of schools, and a federal
mandate for health insurance, suggest that the nature of government intervention in
'8This may be partly related to the nature of current policies toward children and
the elderly: education is provided by a public bureaucracy, medical care by the private
market with public subsidy. Voters may not like expanding the bureaucracy.44
these markets is subject to continuing evaluation and potential change. This
underscores the need for further investigation of both the arguments for government
intervention in these areas, and the merits and demerits of alternative instruments for
market intervention.45
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Table 1: Government Spending Programs Directed Toward Children, 1990
Program Description Spending ($ Billion)
Cash Transfers
Social Security 8.9
Supplemental Security Income 1.4
Aid to Families with Dependent Children i 2.9
Veterans Compensation 0.5





Medicaid (mult by 1.755 to get 12.63) 7.2
Housing Assistance 7.5




Education for the Handicapped i .6
Other Education Programs i .
Other Federal Programs
Child Support Programs o.s
Human Development (Head Start and Other) 1.8
Foster Care/Adoption Assistance 1.6
Maternal and Child Health & Immunization 0.8
Summer Youth Employment 0.7
Other 0.6
Revenue Loss from Tax Credits
Earned Income Tax Credit 2.0
Dependent Care Credit 2.4
Exclusion of Employer-Provided Dependent Care 0.5
Exclusion of Benefits Provided Through Cafeteria Plans 3.1
State and Local Education Spending 194.0
Source: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 1993 Green
ook: Overview of Entitlement Prpnrams: Beckcirpund Material and Data on Prpcirpms
within the ,Jurisdictipn of the Committee on Ways and Means (U.S. Government
Printing Office: 1 993), pp. 1 566-7, and author's tabulations.50





- Other (VA, NIH) 46
State & Local 115
- Medicaid 53
- Other (Workers' Compensation, Public Hospitals) 62
Tax Expenditures on Health (Federal & State)
Exemption of Employer-Provided Health Insurance 45
Untaxed Medicare Benefits 8
Deductibility of Medical Expenses 3
Other (Tax-Exempt Debt, Charitable Deductions) 4
Total $428
Source: Author's tabulations based on information in CBO (1992), Tables 11 and 8-2.